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Max Bergholz’s Violence as a Generative Force is an impressive work—notable for both its depth 
of focus, and its breadth of analysis. It gives a detailed accounting of a massacre in the Bosnian 
town of Kulen Vakuf in 1941, while also considering what this incident can tell us about collective 
violence more generally.  
Bergholz’s work is situated within a growing body of micro-level research into the dynamics of 
collective violence at the local level (such as the work of Lee Ann Fujii, Scott Straus, Omar McDoom, 
Stathis Kalyvas, and others).1 While undertaking an exhaustive historical study, Bergholz also 
connects his research to social scientific theories on nationalism and the causes of mass violence. 
His central argument, as embodied in his title, is that (ethnic) identity is not necessarily a cause of 
violence: violence, can also create identity.
He rejects classical approaches to analyzing conflict in the Western Balkans, which frame 
violence as between ethnic groups (e.g. Serbs vs. Croats). These macro approaches essentialize 
violence as a war of all Serbs against all Croats. Through this framing, violence is depoliticised and 
naturalized as an inevitable consequence of deep-seated antagonisms.  Such an approach tells us 
little about how and why conflict occurs in some places and times and not others. Bergholz draws 
from sociologist Rogers Brubaker in arguing that ethnic war frames of analysis drive research 
towards erroneous conclusions. One might even argue that these ethnicized approaches to conflict 
analysis echo the perpetrator gaze, which sees ethnic or religious identity as being all encompassing 
and often presents ethnic diversity as an inevitable source of conflict (or a threat to the survival of 
the in-group).2 In articulating this critique Violence as a Generative Force challenges methodological 
and analytical assumptions about conflict and genocide.   
Although the book is focused on a single case, Bergholz draws from a broad range of empirical 
and theoretical sources on political violence ranging from Kakar’s studies of riots in South Asia 
to Kalyvas’ insights into the unfolding of local level violence in the Greek Civil War, to Straus’ 
analyses of the Rwandan Genocide. This moves the book from being mere description of a massacre 
in a small town on the Bosnian-Croatian border to addressing broader questions on the dynamics 
of political violence.  
Bergholz dismisses the oft-stated riddle of how neighbors could kill neighbors by drawing 
from criminological research to note that violent crime is often intimate. There is no reason to 
expect that mass crime should be any different in this respect. There is a political context to mass 
crimes that is not present with conventional acts of murder, yet even crimes against humanity and 
genocide are composed of innumerable individual episodes of violent killing. Thus, the massacre in 
1 Lee-Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Straus, The Order 
of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Omar Shahabudin McDoom, “Who 
killed in Rwanda’s genocide? Micro-space, social influence, and individual participation in intergroup violence,” 
Journal of Peace Research 50, no.4 (2013); Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
2 Brakstad, Ingjerd Veiden: “’Eldgammelt etnisk hat’ – myter og avpolitiseringen av politisk vold. En analyse av 
samtidens norske medieframstillinger av massevolden i Bosnia-Hercegovina (1992-95) og Rwanda (1994)”. English 
title: “’Ancient ethnic hatred’ - Myths and the depoliticization of political mass violence.” Ph.D. thesis in history, 
Department of Historical Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2016.
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Kulen Vakuf, like all other episodes of mass violence, represented an opportunity for the settling of 
personal scores and the reconfiguration of power at the local level.  The extreme acts of violence in 
this case were often extreme precisely because the perpetrators knew (and harboured resentments) 
towards the victims. Bergholz draws from micro-sociologist Randall Collins’ work in also arguing 
that excessive force can also be explained through “forward panic”—the excessive force that 
often follows a rapid shift in power (such as a police chase ending, or troops surrendering after 
an intense battle).3 There are probably additional dynamics at play here, such as: the opportunity 
for individuals predisposed to sadism to engage in satisfying acts of violence, the competitive 
spirit and festive atmosphere accompanying violence, and the situational sadism facilitated by the 
extreme power differentials between victim and perpetrator. There can be a reticence from some 
historians to engage social science in their work (particularly psychology), but Bergholz makes 
good use of the experimental and theoretical insights of these disciplines in explaining individual 
participation in violence.  
His findings challenge the notion that nationalism always drives violence, rather arguing that 
violence also produces nationalism.  This echoes studies done by Straus and others (including 
myself) concluding that perpetrators of collective violence are often acting for reasons that have 
little to do with deeply felt ethnic antagonisms.4  However, violence has the potential to strengthen 
“groupism” and perceived difference, while also producing motivations for future retaliatory 
violence by the victim group against the perpetrator group.  This is, to some extent, what happened 
in Kulen Vakuf in 1941. The persecution of Serbs by the (Croatian) Ustaše was used as a justification 
for the wholesale massacre of Croats in July and August of 1941 (under the Independent State of 
Croatia, the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska/NDH). The “mutually reinforcing fears” of the groups 
provided a vocabulary to justify further acts of violence. 
Yet, there is another equally-important story here. Bergholz argues that nationalism can be 
produced suddenly in periods of insecurity and violence; yet violence also brings forth forces 
of restraint including counter-narratives to exclusionary ethno-nationalism. Bergholz writes: 
“moments of extreme intercommunal violence can, in fact, forge inter-ethnic solidarity, which can 
then create the basis for the resistance to sudden nationhood. This violence, then, generates the 
mental templates not only for sudden nationhood, but also for its restraint....”5 He is essentially 
arguing that violence as an alpha process is followed by beta processes—actions produce a reaction. 
Just as people have a range of options in responding to the occurrence of violence, they have a range 
of options for making sense of violence. Acts of violence are communicative—sending a message 
to participants, victims, and bystanders, but so are acts of rescue, resistance, and restraint. Even 
amidst interethnic strife there are opportunities for building interethnic solidarity, something that 
is often lost in the existing literature on political violence.  For example, a Serb who was rescued 
by a Croat in the early days of Ustaše violence might later act to restrain Serbian Chetnik violence 
against Croats. Violence is a generative force, producing nationalism and other social and political 
responses.  
These responses are included in a chapter on “sudden nationhood,” which addresses the 
years after the massacre at Kulen Vakuf.  Communist Yugoslavia endeavored greatly to eliminate 
sectarianism in the form of laws prosecuting those who undermined the “peace and brotherhood” 
of the country. Yet, the legacy of violence could not easily be erased; for example, the book recounts 
a story of a tailor being brought to tears at the realization that the customer in front of him was 
wearing the watch of his son.  These narratives make the book richly detailed, rooted in “thick 
description” of the case, but nevertheless recognizable to scholars focused on other cases.
The resolutely micro approach of the book is both its strength and its weakness.  In focusing 
on the endogenous factors of violence in Kulen Vakuf, perhaps violence sometimes seems like it 
is entirely dependent on local factors. Yet the state (the NDH) provided the opportunity for the 
initial unchecked Ustaše criminality against Serbs and other minorities, which later produced the 
3 Randall Collins, “Micro and Macro Causes of Violence,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 3, no. 1 (2009).
4 Kjell Anderson, Perpetrating Genocide: A Criminological Account (London: Routledge, 2018).
5 Max Bergholz, Violence as a Generative Force: Identity, Nationalism, and Memory in a Balkan Community (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2016), 320.
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(excessive) retaliatory violence against Croats. Perhaps as an act of rebellion, it is easier to see 
the endogenous aspects of the Kulen Vakuf massacres. Bergholz is, of course, not unaware of the 
larger political context of the massacre, and this is also represented in the book in limited fashion. 
Ultimately, the choice to focus on the micro level was a wise one, as Bergholz was able delve deeply 
into the case, to challenge many assumptions about the nature of collective violence.
In responding to macro-level (quasi-primordial) approaches to studying conflict the book may 
also sometimes underplay the saliency of ethnic identity. While it is true that all conflict is ultimately 
produced through political decisions, individual alignment to groups is often more persistent 
than the concept of “sudden nationhood” seems to indicate. Although many Serbs certainly had 
good relations towards their Croat neighbors, and no deep-seated feeling of antagonism, it is 
no coincidence that ethnic identity proved to be such a powerful means of generating political 
mobilization. As Eck has noted, in-group mobilization costs are greatly reduced where conflict 
is ethnic.6   In other words, ethnicity remains politically and socially-salient to many individuals; 
nationhood is sudden, in certain respects, but it may also be drawing from ongoing perceptions of 
group membership.  I am certain that Bergholz would agree with me here, but in emphasizing the 
malleability and fluidity of nationalism and identity, this point is sometimes lost.    
Nonetheless, I would strongly recommend Violence as a Generative Force as a book which is 
rich in empirical detail and theoretical insight.  Max Bergholz’s analysis of the micro-dynamics 
of violence and nationalism is fascinating and useful to scholars who study political violence, 
genocide, and the Western Balkans region.  
6 Kristine Eck, “From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification,” International Studies Quar-
terly, no. 53 (2009).
